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The darkness below..
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| Brighton 1867 |
This time on the PSS Brighton. Deep dark and very poor visibility. However, harsh beauty of dark wrecks, looming in flashlights, surrounded by deep green space can steal every divers heart in one moment.
Ounce again I geared up, splashed, let the air out of my wing and I began working my way to the ocean floor following the long line down into the darkness. As I descended the shot to the middle of the wreck it was obvious this was going to be a very murky and dark dive, the visibility was poor at best. I chuckled to myself thinking of the air divers coming down behind me dealing with the dark 48 metres and the effects of Nitrogen Narcosis ... Recreational Trimix!!!.. Back to reality. I was tasked with tying in the shot which had missed the wreck by about 5 metres. I knew I must have been close to the wreck as something was blocking almost all the sunlight from above making it almost pitch black. I could barley make out the line, at this point I briefly checked my air and depth before continuing to tie in. That was a mistake I had lost sight of the shot, finding it took a minute of precious bottom time. Once I was able to tie in and shoot the grapple back to the surface I looked at the cage like structure of the paddle steamer Brighton. Upright and partly intact laying on a sandy bottom in around 48 metres of water. My plan for this dive was to circumnavigate the entire wreck, so off I went heading north for the pointy end which is mostly disappearing, sunk into the white sand bottom. Mat had joined me with his Gopro by this time as we both passed the paddle wheels which can still be seen and parts of deckhouse standing proud off the sea floor as we headed for the stern. Ounce there despite that poor visibility and darkness you could almost make out some decent sized chunks of metal sticking up of the sea floor which looked like parts of the steering gear. There were pout everywhere and usually all you can see of them was the gold/silver glimmer of their scales in the darkness which was pretty eerie. Sadly at this depth bottom time is not long so after 20mins it was time to start my ascent, it would be another 30mins before reaching the surface.
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| Silvia K |
The Brighton is a relatively flat and broken up wreck but the opportunity to dive something which sank in the 19th century and as unique as a paddle steamer plus the sheer volume of life make this a worthwhile dive. Thanks go out to Mat for taking us out and videoing on Silvia K and JP for some great images
Mat and I in the Dark Gloom
Wreck Report for 'Brighton', 1887
The Merchant Shipping Acts, 1854 to 1876.
IN the matter of the formal Investigation held at the Sessions House, Westminster, on the 1st and 2nd of March 1887, before H. C. ROTHERY, Esquire, Wreck Commissioner, assisted by Captains RONALDSON and GROVES, as Assessors, into the circumstances attending the stranding and loss of the steamship "BRIGHTON" on a rock near the Island of Guernsey, on the 29th of January 1887.
Report of Court.
The Court, having carefully inquired into the circumstances of the above-mentioned shipping casualty, finds, for the reasons annexed, that the stranding and loss of the said ship was due to the wrongful acts and defaults of Thomas Painter, the master. The Court accordingly suspends his certificate for six months, but recommends that during the period of the suspension of his master's certificate a first mate's be granted to him.
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| Brighton moored in weymouth pre 1887 |
This case was heard at Westminster on the 1st and 2nd of March 1887, when Mr. Macdonell appeared for the Board of Trade, Mr. Barnes for the owners and master of the "Brighton," and Mr. Bowen for the Great Western Railway, the owners of the cargo on board the said vessel. Eight witnesses having been produced by the Board of Trade and examined, Mr. Macdonell handed in a statement of the questions upon which the Board of Trade desired the opinion of the Court. Mr. Barnes having then produced a witness addressed the Court on behalf of his parties, and Mr. Macdonell having been beard in reply, the Court proceeded to give judgment on the questions on which its opinion had been asked.
The facts of this case are extremely simple. The "Brighton" was a paddle steam ship, belonging to the port of Weymouth, of 316 tons gross and 136 tons net register, and was fitted with engines of 140 horse-power. She was built at Jarrow, in the county of Durham, in the year 1857, and at the time of her loss was the property of the Weymouth and Channel Islands Steam Packet Company, Limited, Mr. John Wimble, of La Chasse, Jersey, being the manager. She left Weymouth at 0.10 a.m. of the 29th of January last, with a crew of 24 hands all told, 23 passengers, and from 30 to 40 tons of general cargo, bound to Guernsey and Jersey. On leaving the weather was thick and foggy, but there was a smooth sea with no wind; and she proceeded with her engines going easy, until she had passed the end of the Mole, when the weather having become clear, the Shambles Light being visible at a distance of 5 miles, orders were given to go on full speed; and at 1 a.m. the two lights of Portland were in one; upon which she was put on a S. by W. course, and the patent log was set. Shortly afterwards the weather became thick again, and accordingly the master telegraphed for the engines to go at half-speed. Some time afterwards, but when precisely we were not told, the second officer went to the log, and found that it registered 37 miles; and at 6.30 a.m. he looked at it again, and found that it shewed 48 miles. On reporting this to the master, the latter came to the conclusion that they were about a mile to the southward of the Casquets, and he accordingly continued his course, and in about 12 or 14 minutes afterwards the chief officer, by the master's directions, went to the log, and found that it registered 50 miles. Almost immediately afterwards rocks were observed on all sides of them, upon which orders were at once given by the master to stop and reverse full speed, but before the way could be taken off her she struck. Finding that the vessel was fast filling, the master then ordered the boats to be got out, and all hands got into them and pulled clear; and in about 20 minutes from the time of striking, the vessel foundered in deep water. The boats were then allowed to drift with the tide, which was setting to the S.E., but in about an hour it cleared up, and they then found themselves in the entrance to the Little Russell Channel, and knew therefore that the rocks on which they had struck were the Braye Rooks. They then pulled for Guernsey, and at about 9.30 a.m. landed in Bordeaux Harbour, which is a little to the north of St. Sampson's Harbour. The place where the vessel lies has not, I am told, been yet discovered.
These being the facts of the case, the first question upon which our opinion has been asked is, "What " number of compasses had the vessel on board; where " were they placed; and when and by whom were they " last adjusted?" On the bridge there was a spirit compass, by which the courses were set and the vessel steered. There was also a standard compass aft, in case they should have occasion to use the tiller. From an account which was produced, they appear to have been adjusted in June 188 by Frederick Smith, of Plymouth, a chronometer maker, who is described as an adjuster of iron ship's compasses approved by the Board of Trade.
The second question which we are asked is, "Were " the errors of the compasses correctly estimated, and " proper corrections to the courses applied?" The master had commanded her since the 1st of December last, and had during that time made 16 voyages in her between Weymouth and the Channel Islands. He had had, therefore, plenty of opportunities of seeing whether there were any errors in them, and of making the requisite corrections; and this he seems to have done; and he told us that on a S. by W. course there was no error.
The third question which we are asked is, "Whether " proper means existed on board the vessel for regulating and accurately recording her speed?" The only means which the master had of recording the speed of the vessel was by a Walker's patent taffrail log, which, we are told, was set by the quartermaster when they passed Portland Head, But I am told by the assessors that logs cannot be implicitly relied on, and that they have frequently known two logs which have been put out, one upon each quarter, in a run of 100 to 150 miles shew a difference of as much as 10 miles. it therefore behoves a master not to rely solely upon his log for the distance run but to take every possible opportunity that may offer of verifying it.
The fourth question which we are asked is, "Whether " in the engine-room proper means existed for indicating accurately the speed of the engines?" This vessel having been built so long since as the year 1857, and the engines having been put into her at that time, she had not all the modern appliances for accurately measuring the speed of the engines; she had, in fact, no indicator, without which it is not possible to say what number of revolutions the engines were making. The engineers told us that they were making only 23 revolutions instead of 33 revolutions, which was their full speed; but this would only have been a rough estimate, and there is nothing to shew us that it was a correct one; and from facts, to which I shall presently refer, we are satisfied that it was not correct.
The fifth question which we are asked is, "Whether " a safe and proper course was set and steered at or " about 1 a.m. on the 29th of January, when the Port- " laud Lights were in one; and whether due and proper " allowance was made for tide and currents?" The course steered from off Portland Head was S. by W., and if there had been no tide and no current either way, and the course had been made good, it would have taken her, the master told us, some four miles to the eastward of the Casquets. He stated, however, that it being high water that morning at two o'clock, they would have the current setting them to the eastward for the first hour from 1 a.m. to 2 a.m; then for about 20 minutes or half-an-hour they would have slack water, and after that, for about four hours, they would have the tide setting them to the westward; and he calculated that that would take them some four miles to the westward of the Casquets. And the fact that they struck on the Braye Rocks seems to shew that that was about the distance at which they had passed the Casquets. The course therefore was a safe and proper one; and the fault was in continuing it for too long a time.
The sixth question which we are asked is, "Whether " the master took proper measures to ascertain the " distance the vessel had run?" The only means which the master took to ascertain the distance run, was by looking or rather sending one of the officers to look at the log, and on hearing after running 5 1/2 hours that the log shewed 48 miles, he supposed that she was going a little over 8 knots an hour. s a fact, however, the distance from Portland Head to the Braye Rocks is about 60 miles, and this distance was run in 5 3/4 hours; and allowing, as Mr. Barnes has said, 3 knots for the set of the tide, that would leave 57 miles, which the vessel did in 5 3/4 hours, giving about 10 knots an hour through the water for the whole distance. And seeing that her full speed was only 11 knots, it is clear that from the time she passed Portland Head until she struck, she was going very nearly at full speed. Now, the assessors tell me that a captain who knew the vessel as well as this captain knew her, and who had commanded her since the 1st of December last, during which time he had made 16 voyages in her between Weymouth and the Channel Islands, ought to have known whether she was making 8 or 10 knots. They tell me, however, that it is not an uncommon thing for the captain and engineer to have an understanding that, when the telegraphs points to half speed, the engines are not to be put down to half speed, but only to be reduced slightly, so that in the event of a collision occurring they might be able to say that the telegraph was pointing to half-speed. Whether or not this be the true explanation of the case, certain it is that the vessel was going from Portland Head at the rate of about 10 knots an hour the whole way, and that either the master took no measures to ascertain the speed at which she was running, or, if he did, took no steps to reduce it.
The seventh question which we are asked is," Whether " the total neglect of the lead was justifiable?" The assessors are of opinion that the total neglect of the lead was in this case quite unjustifiable. They think that the master ought to have taken a cast of the lead before they got to the Casquets, so as to satisfy himself that the vessel had been set by the tide sufficiently far to the westward to clear them. And if, after clearing the Casquets, he chose to continue his course, he should have kept the lead almost constantly going, so as to prevent the vessel getting into less than 34 fathoms. Had he done so, he would have been warned in sufficient time of his danger, for on looking at a chart it will be seen that in the direction from which this vessel would be approaching the rocks, there would be 34 fathoms at a distance of a little over 5 miles from the Braye Rocks, and that from there the soundings fall to 31, 30, and 27 fathoms and less. So that, if at any time within half an hour of his going on the rocks, he had taken a cast of the lead, he would, assuming that he was going at 10 knots an hour, have found himself in 31 fathoms or less, and would have known that he was getting into dangerous waters. In our opinion the total neglect of the lead was in this case unjustifiable.
The eighth question which we are asked is, "Whether " a good and proper look-out was kept?" It seems that the master and both the officers remained on deck from the time of their leaving Weymouth until the vessel struck. The master and chief officer were on the starboard side, whilst the second officer and one or two of the seamen were on the port side of the bridge. There is, therefore, no reason to think that a good look was not being kept; but a good look-out in weather which is described by one of the men as being so thick that you could sometimes see as far as the bows of the vessel, and sometimes not so far, would not be of much use. . Moreover, the extreme density of the atmosphere is sufficiently proved by the fact that, before they saw the rocks, they were in the midst of them.
The ninth question which we are asked is, "What " was the cause of the casualty?" The casualty was, no doubt, due to the great speed at which the vessel was going, and to her having been kept on her course for too long a time without any steps having been taken to ascertain either her true position or the distance run.
The tenth question which we are asked is, "Whether " the vessel was navigated with proper and seaman like " care?" To run at the rate of 10 knots an hour, or nearly at full speed, through so thick a fog past the Casquets without taking a cast of the lead, and to continue that course until she struck on the Braye Rocks, was neither proper nor seaman like conduct.
The eleventh question which we are asked is, "Whether the master and officers are, or either of " them is, in default?" And it is added that, "in the " opinion of the Board of Trade, the certificate of the " master should be dealt with." It is admitted that the whole blame for this casualty rests with the master, and with the master alone. Fortunately the sea was perfectly smooth, and there was no wind; otherwise there would probably have been a large loss of life. And if, instead of having only 23 passengers, she had had her usual summer complement of, say 200, passengers, seeing that she sank within 20 minutes of her having struck, the loss of life, even with a smooth sea and no wind, would have been very great; for there were only three boats, 2 life boats and a gig, which would have been quite insufficient to have taken them all. This is another case of reckless navigation, arising from over confidence. The master, it seems, had been for 16 years in the service of the company, first as 2nd mate, then as chief mate, and from 1881 as master; he had made the voyage 816 times, and he thought, therefore, no doubt that he might dispense with the ordinary precautions observed by seamen when they are ignorant of the vessel's position. But to run a passenger ship through so thick a fog at the rate of 10 knots an hour, without taking steps to estimate accurately the speed, or to ascertain the position of the vessel by a cast of the lead, is in our opinion conduct so reckless and unjustifiable, that we feel bound to suspend the master's certificate for 6 months.
The Court however, at the application of counsel for the master, agreed to recommend to the Board of Trade that, during the suspension of his master's certificate, he should be allowed a chief mate's
